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Standard tax competition models predict a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ of corporate tax rates when 
firms are mobile. Recent theoretical literature has qualified this view by offering a theoretical 
explanation why this extreme prediction need not occur: central regions with large clusters of 
economic activity are able to set positive tax rates without fearing to lose firms to peripheral 
regions as the firms would forego ‘rents’ from agglomeration economies. In this paper, we 
study whether local policy makers effectively tax such agglomeration rents. We test this with 
panel data from Swiss municipalities between 1985 and 2005. We find that large urban areas 
set indeed higher tax rates than small ones. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction. 
Within urban areas, however, municipal tax rates are unrelated to the size of economic 
activity in and around municipalities while they are positively related to the size of the 
political jurisdiction. We see this result as evidence that the standard tax competition model 
for asymmetric jurisdictions is at work in the competition of municipalities within an urban 
area. Both results are robust to controlling for reverse causality by using instrumental 
variables. Controlling for fixed effects in a 20 year panel is non-informative and neither 
supports nor contradicts these findings. As a robustness check we introduce an new measure 
of cluster intensity which considers the varying intensities in agglomeration economies across 
sectors. 
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Standard tax competition models predict a `race-to-the-bottom' of corporate tax rates
when rms are mobile. The new economic geography (NEG) literature has qualied this
view by oering a theoretical explanation why this extreme prediction need not occur:
central regions with large clusters of economic activity are able to set positive tax rates
without fearing to lose rms to peripheral regions as the rms would forego `rents' from ag-
glomeration economies such as market access, supplier proximity or knowledge spillovers.
In this paper, we study whether local policy makers eectively tax agglomeration rents,
and whether this eect is strong enough to have a noticeable impact on the evolution of
statutory corporate tax rates across Swiss urban areas and municipalities.
The NEG prediction can be tested by showing that small regions exhibit lower tax rates
than bigger ones. Although this test seems straightforward to implement there is a series
of challenges. First, the standard tax competition model with asymmetric jurisdiction
size also predicts that small locations (tax havens) have lower tax rates than large ones,
but the economic implications are very dierent. To separate the two predictions we
make a clear dierence between the political and the economic size of a location. To
identify the two eects separately, we take advantage of the fact that small and medium
sized municipalities can be found both in the centre and the periphery of an urban area.
Second, unobserved and unobservable local characteristics could have an important eect
on local tax rates. We therefore control for observable location characteristics in our cross-
section analysis. Furthermore, we control for unobserved local characteristics by including
municipality xed eects in our panel analysis. Third, the size of local jurisdictions is likely
aected by local tax rates and therefore endogenous. We instrument for location size with
a set of variables based on 19th century population, initially available land reserves and
initial sector composition.
A further empirical challenge arises from the elegant but unrealistic description of
local jurisdictions in the theoretical models. The theoretical literature assumes that local
jurisdictions are politically and economically independent from each other. In reality,
countries are typically divided into economically fairly independent urban areas which
are formed of a multitude of economically dependent and politically fairly independent
municipalities. We develop two strategies to address this issue. First, we do an analysis
at the urban area level, treating each urban area as an independent entity. In this ap-
proach, economic and political size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the urban area, overlap.
Second, we do a municipality level analysis. In this approach, the political and economic
size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the municipality, diverge. We therefore introduce two
dierent measures for the economic size of the municipality: economic activity within the
3legal borders and the distance weighted size of economic activity within and around the
municipality.
Another aspect typically ignored by the theoretical literature is the industry com-
position of agglomeration. Because dierent industries can exhibit dierent degrees of
agglomeration economies, the industry composition at the local level could have an im-
portant eect on taxation. We therefore propose a new cluster intensity measure to deal
with this problem.
We base our estimations on data for Switzerland. The Swiss federation consists of
three government layers (federal, cantonal and municipal), with each jurisdictional level
collecting a roughly similar share of total tax revenue. Cantons and municipalities enjoy
vast autonomy in the determination of their tax rates, and, as a consequence, we observe
large variations in tax burdens even within the small area covered by Switzerland. The
Swiss scal system therefore provides a well suited laboratory in which to examine our
research question.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 explains our empirical strategy. In
section 4, we describe data and variables used for the estimations. The results of the main
analysis are reported in section 5. In section 6, we propose a new cluster measure and
discuss the results using this alternative measure. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background and Empirical Literature
The implications of agglomeration economies for strategic tax setting have been studied
in a number of theoretical contributions, including Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind
et al. (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), and Borck
and P uger (2006). See Baldwin et al. (2004, chapters 15 and 16) for a comprehensive
overview of this often called New Economic Geography (NEG) literature. The key insight
of this literature is that agglomeration forces make the world `lumpy': when capital (or
any other relevant production factor) is mobile and trade costs are suciently low, ag-
glomeration forces lead to spatial concentrations of rms which cannot easily be dislodged
by tax dierentials. Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) have shown that in the presence
of agglomeration economies tax competition can be second-best welfare-enhancing, as it
may mitigate a tendency towards excessive spatial concentration of rms. In fact, ag-
glomeration externalities create rents that can in principle be taxed by the jurisdiction
hosting the agglomeration.
This prediction contrasts with results from the standard tax competition literature,
where mobile factors such as capital lead to ineciently low tax rates because of com-
4petition among local governments. The standard tax competition literature goes back
to Oates (1972), who already describes how jurisdictions lower tax rates to attract busi-
ness investment. The rst formalised models were developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986). These papers nd that because of tax competition local gov-
ernments set capital tax rates and the level of public spending ineciently low.
In an extension to the standard tax competition literature, Bucovetsky (1986) and
Wilson (1991) introduce asymmetric country size. They nd that because the marginal
product of capital is higher in the smaller country, the elasticity of capital with respect to
the capital tax rate must be higher. This results in lower tax rates in the smaller country,
which therefore will be a tax haven. Hence, both the New Economic Geography model
and the tax haven model can predict a positive correlation between jurisdiction size and
tax rates; though the economic mechanisms and implications are very dierent.
Br ulhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007) have studied whether the main mechanism
behind the NEG prediction is at work, i.e. whether rms really are less sensitive to local
taxes in the presence of agglomeration economies. Drawing on a rm-level dataset for
Switzerland and employing xed-eects count-data estimation techniques, we found that
rm births on average react negatively to corporate tax burdens, but that the deterrent
eect of taxes is weaker in sectors that are more spatially concentrated. Firms in sectors
with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are
up to 50 percent more responsive to a given dierence in corporate tax burdens than rms
in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile.
There is yet only preliminary direct evidence of the NEG prediction. Charlot and
Paty (2007), Jofre-Montseny and Sol e-Oll e (2009) and Koh and Riedel (2010) are the rst
attempts to directly test whether agglomeration rents are taxed, by showing that local
taxes are positively correlated with local agglomeration economies. Charlot and Paty
(2007) assess the eect of agglomeration (measured as market access) on local taxation.
They use panel data for French municipalities and nd a positive eect of market access
on taxation, and mimic behaviour in tax setting across municipalities. Jofre-Montseny
and Sol e-Oll e (2009) focus on the eect of urbanisation economies, localisation economies
and market potential on the Spanish municipal business tax rate. Using a cross-section
of Spanish municipality level data, they nd that all of the above factors have a positive
eect on tax rates. Koh and Riedel (2010) determine the tax eect of urbanisation
and localisation economies, and investigate whether dierentiation from neighbouring
economies has an eect on business tax rates. Using panel data for local business tax
rates in Germany, they nd a positive impact of agglomeration and dierentiation on tax
rates.
Our paper is complementary to these three studies and seeks to overcome their short-
5comings in several dimensions. First, we analyse data for Switzerland which is the only
country studied so far where local business taxes are substantial enough to plausibly mat-
ter for business location. Second, we study the evolution of local tax rates over a much
longer time horizon (20 years) than previous research. Our paper has therefore the po-
tential to cover substantial changes in the size of local jurisdictions. Third, we propose
new and in our opinion more convincing instruments for the employment growth rate
of locations. Fourth, we explicitly address and operationalise the important distinction
between the political and economic size of local jurisdictions, which has been ignored in
previous studies.
3 The econometric model
The theoretical literature elegantly assumes that local jurisdictions are politically and
economically independent from each other. In reality, countries are typically divided into
economically fairly independent urban areas which are formed of a multitude of politically
fairly independent municipalities. We develop two strategies to address this issue. First,
we do an analysis at the urban area level, treating each urban area as an independent
entity. In this rst approach, economic and political size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the
urban area, overlap. Second, we do a municipality level analysis. In this second approach,
the political and economic size of the local jurisdiction, i.e. the municipality, diverge.
We therefore introduce two dierent measures for the economic size of the municipality:
economic activity within the legal borders and the distance weighted size of economic
activity within and around the municipality. See the description of the corresponding
variables in section 4.3 for the operationalisation of these two variables.
We estimate the following relationship at the urban area level:
Taxa = 0 + 1 log(Empla) + 2Xa + ua (1)
Where Taxa is the average tax rate over the individual municipalities of the urban area
a, location size Empla is measured as total employment in the urban area and Xa is a
vector of other characteristics describing the urban area.
We estimate the following relationship at the municipality level:
Taxi = 0 + 1 log(Empl
muni
i ) + 2 log(Empl
dist
i ) + 3Xi + ui (2)
where Emplmuni
i is the location size within the legal borders of municipality i, Empldist
i is
the distance-weighted size of the economically relevant area in and around municipality i
and Xi is a vector of control variables.
6Although we use a wide range of control variables, it is still possible that there are
unobserved and unobservable local characteristics with an important eect on taxation.
We use the long dierence (20 years) between 1985 and 2005 to control for omitted
factors with a dierence-in-dierence strategy. In addition, we include time xed eects
to capture time trends in the data. In the urban area level analysis, we estimate the
following panel data equation:
Taxat = 0 + 1 log(Emplat) + 3Xat + t + ca + uat (3)
where ca are urban area xed eects and t time xes eects. In the municipality level
analysis, the estimated equation is
Taxit = 0 + 1 log(Empl
muni
it ) + 2 log(Empl
dist
it ) + 3Xit + t + ci + uit (4)
where ci are municipality xed eects. As there are only two data waves, the xed eects
estimator will be identical to the estimation in rst dierences
Taxit =  + 1log(Empl
muni
it ) + 2log(Empl
dist
it ) + 3Xit + vit (5)
where Taxit = Tit   Taxi;t 1, log(Emplit) = log(Emplit=Si;t 1) and vit = uit.
We have to take into account that the size of local jurisdictions is likely endogenous.
First, locations with low taxes are likely to attract { ceteris paribus { more rms and
hence are larger then locations with high taxes. This leads to endogeneity from reversed
causality. Second, there may be omitted variables that explain both tax rates and location
size. We therefore estimate equations (1) to (5) using instrumental variables. See sections
4.5 and 4.6 for a description of the used instruments.
4 Data and Variables
We base our estimations on data for Switzerland. For a number of reasons, the Swiss
scal system provides a well suited laboratory in which to examine our research question.
The Swiss federation consists of three government layers (federal, cantonal and munic-
ipal), with each jurisdictional level collecting a roughly similar share of total tax revenue.
Cantons and municipalities enjoy vast autonomy in the determination of their tax rates,
and, as a consequence, we observe large variations in tax burdens even within the small
area covered by Switzerland. Cantons and municipalities collect around 65 percent of the
corporate income and capital tax revenue, the remaining 35 percent being raised by the
federal government. Prot taxes account for 85 percent of corporate tax receipts.
74.1 Geographical Denitions
Switzerland was divided into 3022 municipalities in the year 1985.1 This number shrank to
2758 by the year 2005 due to mergers of small municipalities. We combine the municipality
data with historic geographic coordinates to measure the distance between municipalities
as described in section 4.3.2
The Swiss Federal Statistical Oce identied 55 urban areas in the year 2000. Urban
areas are dened similarly to metro- and micropolitan statistical areas (MSA) in the U.S.
They include a densely populated central city and its adjacent municipalities with high
commuting ows to the centre.3 The largest urban area in the year 2000 is Zurich with
a population of 1,080,728 living in 132 municipalities; the smallest is St. Moritz with a
population of 15,757 living in 8 municipalities.4 We use the denition for urban areas
for year 2000 and corresponding list of municipalities throughout including for historical
data from 1985 and 1850.
4.2 Local Business Taxes
We use data on corporate income taxes created by Br ulhart and Jametti (2006) for the
1985 cross-section and by Bacher and Br ulhart (2010) for the 2005 cross-section.5 This
data reports statutory tax rates for the 213 largest municipalities in 1985 and the 845
largest municipalities in 2005.
Our dependent variable is the local tax rate for rms. ProfitTaxi is the corporate
prot tax rate in location i as percentage of a rm's prot. We use the tax rate for a rm
with median prots (9% of turnover in our sample). In the municipality level analysis,
ProfitTaxi is the tax rate in municipality i plus the respective cantonal tax rate. In the
urban area level analysis, ProfitTaxa is the employment-weighted average of the local
1Historical lists of Swiss municipalities are provided in an online tool by the Swiss Federal Statistical
Oce at http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/nomenklaturen/blank/blank/
gem_liste/02.html.
2Geographic coordinates mark the centre of municipalities, typically the church tower or main square.
Coordinates for 2005 are available online from the Federal Statistical Oce at http://www.bfs.admin.
ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/lexikon.html; data for 1985 was directly provided by the Swiss
Federal Statistical Oce.
3The exact denition is given in Schuler, Joye, and Dessemontet (2005) , Eidgen ossische Volksz ahlung
2000: Die Raumgliederungen der Schweiz. Swiss Federal Statistical Oce, Neuenburg.
4The composition of urban areas in the year 2000 are available online from the Swiss Federal
Statistical Oce at http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/11/geo/analyse_
regionen/04.html.
5These variables are based on statutory tax data from the ocial compendium of cantonal tax laws
(Steuern der Schweiz, editions 2001- 2005), and on cantonal and municipal tax multipliers obtained from
the 26 cantonal tax authorities by the authors.
8tax rates ProfitTaxi in all reported municipalities i that belong to urban area a.
Table 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics for the local tax burden for both municipal-
ities and urban areas. The variance of the corporate tax burden is large: the combined
municipal and cantonal prot tax rate was on average 17.7% across the 845 municipalities
in 2005. The highest tax rate, at 23.4%, was more than double the lowest rate, at 11.5%.
Aggregated to the urban area level, the average tax rate was 17.0% across 55 urban areas
ranging from 12.9% to 23.1%. Decomposing the total variance into within and between
variance in the 1985-2005 Panel shows that business tax rates vary almost as much over
time as across locations.
4.3 Location Size
The main explanatory variable is the `size' of the location. We measure the size of the
location by its employment. Local employment gures are generated from rm-level data
in the Swiss Business Census provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Oce.6 This
dataset contains information on location, sector of activity and number of employees for
the universe of about 300,000 rms located across Switzerland in 1985 and 2005.
A main contribution of this paper is to make a clear distinction between the polit-
ical and the economic denition of location size. The political denition refers to the
legal borders of the local jurisdiction whereas the economic denition includes the rele-
vant neighbouring jurisdictions. We use the following variables in the municipality level
analysis:
EmplMunii is the number of full-time jobs in municipality i. Part-time jobs are added
as full-time equivalent. In the municipality level analysis, EmplMunii counts the jobs
within the legal borders of the municipality.
EmplDisti is the number of full-time jobs in the economically relevant area in and
around municipality i. It is the sum of the municipality's own employment and the






where EmplMunii is employment in municipality i and J is the number of municipalities
in the country. We include all of the roughly 3,000 municipalities in this calculation and
not just the 845 for which tax data is available in 2005. Distij is the Euclidean distance
between two municipalities i and i, and if j 6= i is measured as:
Distij =
q
(xi   xj)2 + (yi   yj)2
6Condential access to the universe of the Swiss Business Census was granted by the Swiss Federal











Figure 1: Urban area with large central municipality (A) and both small central (B) and
small peripheral (C) municipalities.
where the x and y coordinates determine the geographical location of municipalities i and







where AreaBuilti is built-up land area in the municipality. The own distance is the
average distance to the municipal centre assuming a circular municipality of the same
size. The own distance acknowledges that rms are on average further away from each
other in large municipalities than in small ones. It also guarantees that our variable
EmplDisti is invariant to the units in which distance is measured.
Figure 1 illustrates how the dierent measures of location size dier for dierent types
of municipalities. It shows a prototypical urban area consisting of a large central mu-
nicipality (A) and both small central (B) and small peripheral (C) municipalities. The
central municipality will have large values both for its own employment EmplMuni as
well as for the employment including its neighbours EmplDist. Small central munici-
palities have a low value for EmplMuni but high values for EmplDist because of their
proximity to the centre. Small peripheral municipalities have low values for EmplMuni
as well as for EmplDist. In regressions including both variables, the identifying varia-
tion that allows to discriminate the eects of the two variables will stem from small and
mid-size municipalities which can be found in the centre as well as the periphery of urban
areas.
In the urban area level analysis, we make no distinction between political and economic
denition. EmplAreaa is the number of jobs in all municipalities i that belong to urban
area a.
Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics for the dierent measures of location size.
10Location sizes measured by EmplMunii, EmplDisti or EmplAreaa vary much across
locations. Municipal employment (EmplMuni) ranges from 52 to 275,864 across the
845 municipalities in 2005; urban area employment (EmplArea) from 3,768 to 555,349.
However, dierent locations are not growing at very dierent rates leading to within
variances which are 8 to 18 times smaller than the corresponding between variances.
4.4 Further Location Characteristics
We also include the following three control variables:
FrenchItaliani and FrenchItaliana are dummy variables which equal 1 if the pop-
ulation in municipality i or, respectively, urban area a are on the majority French or
Italian speaking. Historically, French and Italian speaking Swiss jurisdictions have higher
tax rates than German speaking ones.7
Centrei is a dummy variable which equals 1 if municipality i is the central place of the
urban area it belongs to. CapitalCityi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if municipality
i is the capital of a canton. These variables capture the additional revenue needs of central
places and capital cities, respectively.
4.5 Instruments for Cross-section Analysis
We seek to explain local tax rates with the size of the location. There is obvious concern
about the exogeneity of this variable. First, locations with low taxes are likely to attract
{ ceteris paribus { more rms and hence are larger than locations with high taxes. This
leads to endogeneity from reversed causality. Second, there may be omitted variables that
explain both tax rates and location size. Our proposed instrumental variables mainly seek
to eliminate the bias from reversed causality.
In the 2005 cross-sectional analysis, we use population gures from 1850, the rst
Census after the founding of modern Switzerland, as instruments. Historical population
gures for 1850 are from the Swiss Federal Statistical Oce.8
The variable PopMunii;1850 is the population in municipality i in 1850. The variable
PopDisti;1850 is dened analogously to EmplDisti. It is the sum of the municipality's
7Crivelli, Filippini and Mosca (2006) document higher public health spending in French speaking
cantons. Eugster and Parchet (2011) use a regression discontinuity approach to show that the French
culture causes higher tax rates and public expenditure in Swiss municipalities around the language border.
8We obtained the data through its (now decommissioned) online platform "Statweb". Historical
population gures are reported for present-day municipalities taking into account potential mergers and
split-ups of municipalities.






where Distij is the Euclidean distance between municipalities i and j. This calculation is
based on all of the roughly 3,000 Swiss municipalities. As instrument in the urban area
level analysis, PopAreaa;1850 sums over all municipalities i that belong to urban area a as
dened in 2000.
Descriptive statistics for all instruments are also reported in Tables 1 and 2. Municipal
population (PopMuni) in 1850 ranged from 56 to 41,585 across the 845 municipalities
included in the analysis. Urban area population (PopArea) in 1850 ranged from 1,568 to
181,147 across the 55 urban areas. The employment size of municipalities in present-day
Switzerland is very strongly correlated to the historical population gures 150 years ago:
the correlation between 1850 population and 2005 employment is 0.98 across the 55 urban
areas and 0.88 across the 845 municipalites. Historical population gures obviously rule
out reverse causality and easily fulll the requirement of instrument relevance.
4.6 Instruments for Panel Data Analysis
In the 1985-2005 panel data analysis, xed eects will take care of a large part of potential
omitted variables. However, there remains the concern about reversed causality. Locations
with less increase (or even a decrease) in tax rates will { ceteris paribus { attract more
rms and hence exhibit higher employment growth. We therefore instrument employment
growth from 1985 to 2005. We propose two sets of variables as instruments:
LandReservei is the fraction of land that has not been built-up by 1985 and could
potentially be used for buildings in the subsequent 20 years.9 It is calculated as
LandReservei = 1  
AreaBuilti
AreaTotali
where AreaBuilti is the land area used for housing, businesses and trac; AreaTotali
is the total land area excluding rivers, lakes, mountains, etc. Our denition is entirely
based on the physical characteristics of the location and ignores zoning restrictions. We
think that 1985 zoning restrictions were not binding over the 20 subsequent years as they
could be relaxed by the political economy in locations with strong demand for land. We
expect that this variable is positively correlated with future growth in locations close to
the centre of urban areas where space constraints are most severe. Land reserves in 1985
9Land use for 2005 is from the Federal Statistical Oce, Arealstatistik der Schweiz 2004/09. Historical
data for the period 1979/1985 using historical denitions of municipalities were directly provided by the
Swiss Federal Statistical Oce.
12dier dramatically across the 207 municipalities included in the panel analysis: they range
from almost entirely built-up municipalities with land reserves of 2.4% to almost empty
municipalities with 97% of land which can be potentially built-up.
In the urban area level analysis, LandReserveCentrei is the land reserve in the central
municipality of the urban area. We expect that limited growth potential in the central
municipality hampers the growth of the whole urban area.
PredEmpli is the predicted employment in location i based on its initial 1985 sector
composition and the sectoral growth rates from 1985 to 2005 in Germany10. The calcula-
tion assumes that employment in each sector grows at a sector-specic rate Growths;1985 2005
which is independent of the location. We use the growth rate in Germany, GrowthD
s;1985 2005,




EmplMuniis;1985  (1 + Growth
D
s;1985 2005)
where EmplMuniis;1985 is employment in location i and sector s in 1985 and
GrowthD
s;1985 2005 is the discrete growth rate of employment is sector s in Germany be-
tween 1985 and 2005. We expect higher growth potential in locations with a large initial
share of employment in sectors that turned out to grow fast over the subsequent 20 years.
Our predicted employment is independent of the actual employment growth in Swiss mu-
nicipalities and sectors over the period 1985-2005 hence ruling out reversed causality. The
mean of PredEmplMuni as well as overall, within and between variance are similar to
the realised values in EmplMuni.
PredEmplDisti;2005 is the predicted employment in the economically relevant area in
and around municipality i. This is analogously dened to EmplDisti. We calculate this
measure by summing over the location's own predicted employment and the distance-






where Distij is the Euclidean distance between municipalities i and j.
In the urban area level analysis, PredEmplAreaa is the sum of PredEmplMunii over
all municipalities i that belong to the corresponding urban area a.
In the municipality level analysis, we also use the geographic location within the urban
area as instrument. DistCentrei is the distance of each municipality to the centre of the
urban area. Municipalities that do not belong to any urban area are assigned the distance
to the nearest urban area centre.
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Figure 2: Prot tax rates and employment across 55 urban areas in 2005.
5 Results
We analyse the data on two dierent levels of aggregation. In the urban area level analysis,
data on tax rates and location size are aggregated to the level of urban areas. In the
municipality level analysis, tax rates of individual municipalities and their size are used.
Section 3 discusses these two approaches.
5.1 Urban Area Level Results
Cross-section results of the urban area level analysis for the year 2005 are reported in
Table 3. Column [1] shows the result of a regression of prot tax rates (ProfitTaxi) on
the log of total urban area employment (EmplAreai) across 55 Swiss urban areas. The
tax rates are based on the 553 largest municipalities in the country. The estimated eect
of employment is positive and highly signicant (t = 2:93). The point estimate of 0:0102
means that a doubling in the size of the urban area leads to an increase in tax rates of
log(2)0:0102 = 0:7% points. This is a substantial eect given that tax rates are on average
17% and that the largest urban area is 150 times larger than the smallest urban area (see
Table 1). Figure 2 visualizes this relationship. Column [2] controls the relationship for
dierent cultural background as measured with the dummy variable FrenchItalian. The
control variable is highly signicant and positive but leaves the eect of the urban area
size practically unchanged.
The above reported eects are likely biased as our explanatory variable location size
is not exogenous. Low tax rates attract more businesses leading to larger location size in
14the long run. This leads to a reverse causality problem in our estimation of equation (1).
We therefore estimate the relationship using the population in 1850 (PopAreai;1850) as
instrument. See Section 4.5 for a detailed description and motivation of the instruments
used. Column [3] in Table 3 reports the instrumental variables (IV) estimates. Table A1
in the appendix shows the corresponding rst stage estimates. Our instrument is very
strong with a rst stage F-Test on the excluded instrument of 222.11 The 2nd stage results
reveal a substantially increased point estimate for the eect of location size. This increase
goes in the expected direction as the reverse causality running from taxes to location size
would have predicted a negative relationship between local taxes and location size. The
point estimate of 0:0128 is still signicant on the 1% level and means that a doubling in
the size of the urban area leads to an increase in tax rates of log(2)0:0128 = 0:9% points.
The signicantly positive relationship reported in Table 3 could be confounded with
other factors that dier across urban areas. We seek to control for such omitted factors
with a dierence-in-dierence strategy using the long (20 years) dierence between 1985
to 2005. Table 4 reports random eects (RE) and xed eects estimations for the 1985-
2005 Panel with two waves. Note that tax rates in the panel estimates are based on fewer
municipalities as tax rates in 1985 are only reported for 179 municipalities that belong
to urban areas. The pooled estimation with random eects in column [1] reiterates the
ndings from the 2005 cross-section in Table 1. However, random eects do not yet
control for unobserved urban area characteristics. We therefore estimate equation (3)
using xed eects (FE), i.e. we control for all time-invariant characteristics of the urban
areas. The xed eects (FE) estimator is equivalent to the rst dierence estimator (FD)
which regresses 20-year changes in tax rates on the growth rate of local employment.
Even controlling for urban area xed eects, we nd a positive but insignicant eect.
Note, however, that despite the 20 year lag, the within-variance of log(EmplArea) is 18
times smaller than the between variance. This reects the enormous stability of the Swiss
urban system. It is therefore not unexpected that we do not nd a signicant eect with
so little identifying variation. The large condence bounds include the signicant results
from the 2005 cross-section and do not contradict them.
In the last column [3] of Table 4 we seek to control for the potential reverse causality
of tax rates and size with instrumental variables. As described in section 4.6, our two
instruments are land reserves in the centre municipality in 1985 (LandReserveCentre)
and 2005 employment predicted from the 1985 sector composition (PredEmplArea). Our
11We use robust tests throughout as we have no reason to assume that our error term is homoscedastic.
While it is straightforward to calculate robust test statistics to test for weak instruments, there are no
corresponding critical values for robust tests. The currently best practice is to compare robust test
statistics to critical values developed by Stock and Yogo (2005) under homoscedasticity.
15instruments are individually and jointly highly signicant in the rst stage (see Table A1
in the appendix). Not unexpectedly with a sample size of 53, the F-statistic of 6.88 reveals
that our instruments are nevertheless rather weak. The estimated condence bounds of
the parameter is again non-informative: while we cannot detect a signicant relationship
we can also not rule out the results from the cross-section.
5.2 Municipality Level Results
The results for the 2005 cross-section of the municipality level analysis are given in Table 5.
Column [1] reports the results from a regression of the local prot tax rate on local
employment within municipal borders (EmplMuni) across 845 Swiss municipalities. The
estimated eect is virtually zero and not signicant. Column [2] regresses local taxes on
employment in and around the municipality (EmplDist). The estimated eect is now
positive and highly signicant. Column [3] includes both measures of location size. See
section 4.3 for a description of the two measures and the identifying dierences. The
estimated eects are almost identical to the bivariate results in columns [1] and [2]. The
point estimate of EmplDist is highly signicant (t = 3:28) and almost perfectly matches
our ndings in the urban area level analysis in Table 3, column [1]. Column [4] includes in
addition dummy variables for whether the municipality belongs to the French or Italian
speaking part of Switzerland (FrenchItalian), whether it is the central place of the urban
area (Centre) and whether it is a cantonal capital city (CapitalCity). Controlling for
these additional variables, the eect of urban area size is reinforced while the eect of
jurisdictional size remains zero.
As in the previous section, we are concerned about bias from reverse causality in
columns [1] to [4]. We therefore instrument both the political size of the location
(EmplMuni) and its economic size (EmplDist). We use historical population gures
from 1850 (PopMuni1850 and PopDist1850) as instruments as described in section 4.5.
Column [5] reports the instrumental variables (IV) estimates. First stage results are re-
ported in Table A2 in the appendix. The two instruments are highly signicant predictors
for the corresponding employment variable. The joint F-test for weak instruments which
jointly tests both rst stage regressions is 49 and shows that the instruments are very
strong.12 The IV point estimate for the eect of EmplMuni is now positive and signi-
cant while the eect of EmplDist is almost halved compared to column [4]. This change
of the parameters between OLS and IV goes in the expected direction as the reverse
12We use the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank F-Test. This F-statistic is a generalisation of the Cragg-
Donald (1993) statistic that allows for heteroscedastic errors. While it is straightforward to calculate the
test statistics, there are no corresponding critical values. The currently best practice is to compare robust
test statistics to critical values developed for the Cragg-Donald statistic by Stock and Yogo (2005).
16causality would predict a negative relationship between local taxes and jurisdiction size.
However, the eect of the economically relevant area EmplDist is still much larger (2.5
times) than the eect of the jurisdiction size.
Columns [6] to [10] in Table 5 include a xed eect for each urban area.13 This
analysis relies fully on the variation of location sizes within urban areas and ignores the
dierences across urban areas. Including urban area xed eects fundamentally changes
our results: both jurisdiction (EmplMuni) and area size (EmplDist) have no signicant
eect in any of the specications in columns [6] to [9]. This is not the consequence of a
lack of identifying variation as the condence bounds are small and ruling out eects of
the magnitude reported in column [1] to [4]. The signicantly positive eects in columns
[1] to [4] are therefore entirely driven by dierences across urban areas as documented in
the urban area level analysis in section 5.1.
Column [10] in Table 5 includes urban area xed eects as well as instrumental vari-
ables. The results of the two rst stage regressions are reported in Table A2. As in
column [5], 1850 population for jurisdiction (PopMuni1850) and area size (PopDist1850)
are signicant predictors for 2005 employment and pass the test against weak instruments
(Kleibergen-Paap F = 21). Also as in column [5], controlling for reverse causality mainly
aects the eect of jurisdictions size (EmplMuni). This eect is now positive and signif-
icant while the eect of the area size (EmplDist) remains close to zero and insignicant.
So within urban areas, it is the political size of the municipality that aects local tax
rates while the economic size does not matter: small municipalities set lower taxes than
large ones whether they are in the centre of the economic activity of the urban area or
at its periphery. We see this result as evidence, that the tax haven mechanism rather
than the New Economic Geography (NEG) mechanism is at work in the competition of
municipalities within a given urban area.
Table 6 report the results using a panel with 1985 and 2005 data. Column [1] estimates
the pooled 1985 and 2005 cross-sections with random eects and reiterates the ndings
from Table 5, columns [1] to [4]. Column [2] controls for municipality xed eects, i.e.
for all time-invariant characteristics including urban area xed eects. This xed eects
(FE) estimator is equivalent to the rst dierence estimator (FD) which regresses 20-
year changes in tax rates on the growth rate of local employment. As in the urban
area level analysis, there is very little time variation that we can exploit and the large
condence intervals neither detect signicant eects nor rule out eects as estimated in
the cross-section. Column [3] additionally includes year specic urban area eects leading
to negative though insignicant size eects.
13Municipalities not belonging to an urban area were assigned to the urban area whose central place
is closest to them.
17Column [4] in Table 6 tackles the potential reversed causality of changes in tax rates
on employment growth by instrumenting both employment growth of the jurisdiction and
of the urban area. See section 4.6 for a description of the instruments used. Most of our
5 instruments are highly signicant in both rst stage regressions (see Table A2 in the
appendix) though the joint analysis of both equations with the Kleibergen-Paap (2006)
F-statistics shows that the instruments are rather weak. The estimates in column [4] are
therefore at best indicative.
Summing up the cross-section results in Table 3 and 5, we nd that municipalities in
large urban areas set higher tax rates than municipalities in small urban areas. This is
consistent with the New Economic Geography (NEG) prediction whereby agglomeration
rents are taxed in the competition among urban areas. Within urban areas, however, the
size of the economically relevant area in and around a municipality is unrelated to its tax
level while the size within its political borders is positively related. This result is robust
to controlling for reverse causality by using instrumental variables. We see this result as
evidence, that the tax haven mechanism rather than the NEG mechanism is at work in
the competition of municipalities within an urban area. Controlling for xed eects in the
panel analysis of Tables 4 and 6 is non-informative and neither supports nor contradicts
these ndings.
6 Alternative Cluster Measures
The New Economic Geography (NEG) literature typically considers only urbanisation
economies, and neglects varying intensities in agglomeration economies across sectors. So
far we have followed this simplication in our empirical analysis in section 5. In this
section we construct a cluster intensity measure which takes into account the structure
of the economy at the local level. We also include two well-known measures of sectoral
composition of the local economy: specialisation and diversication.
6.1 Cluster intensity
Dierent industrial sectors exhibit in the real world dierent degrees of agglomeration
rents. In our setting, local jurisdiction can not exploit this heterogeneity as statutory tax
rates apply identically to all sectors. Local jurisdictions can potentially tax agglomeration
rents if three conditions are met: (1) it hosts an industrial cluster of a sector, (2) this
sector is an important fraction of the local economy and (3) this sector is characterised
by important agglomeration economies. This applies for example to the watch-making
industry, an industry characterised by high agglomeration economies which satises con-
18dition (3). Consider Le Locle, a rural town in the Jura. Le Locle hosts one of the largest
concentrations of watch manufacturers in Switzerland, accounting for the majority of local
employment (over 45% in 2005). Now consider Geneva, the 2nd largest city in Switzer-
land. Geneva hosts another main cluster of the watch-making industry, yet it does not
account for a signicant part of the local economy (only 1.5% of local employment in
2005), and therefore does not satisfy condition (2) above.











where Empls is total employment in sector s. EmplMuniis=Empls is the fraction of em-
ployment in sector s located in municipality i; a high number indicates that the munici-
pality hosts an important industrial cluster. The second multiplier EmplMuniis=Empli
is the fraction of employment in municipality i belonging to sector s; a high number in-
dicating that the sector is important for the local economy. The third multiplier s is a
measure of the agglomeration economies in sector s.









where zis = EmplMuniis=Empls and xi = EmplMunii=Empltot, Empltot denoting total




k, where  k is the share of each plant in industry employment, and K the
total number of industry plants. The Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index is constructed to
take into account the possibility of industry agglomeration by pure chance, unrelated to
any agglomeration economies.
6.2 Specialisation and Diversication
Two important factors characterising the economic activity of a municipality are the de-
gree to which they are specialised and diversied. We use in our analysis the specialisation
and diversication indices employed by Duranton and Puga (2000).








14Duranton and Overman (2005) propose an alternative index which avoids the border problem of
the Ellison-Glaeser index. Unfortunately, we cannot use this index as we lack information on the exact
geographic location of rms in our data.
19where EmplMuniis is the number of employees in municipality i working in sector s and
EmplMunii is as dened above. This index measures the importance of the largest sector
in a municipality, and allows for a comparison across municipalities.









This index increases with increasing diversity of the local economy, equalling 1 if the
activity of a sector is entirely concentrated in one municipality.
Note that using these specications, diversication and specialisation are not exactly
opposites. A municipality with one very important sector but many less important ones
can be both specialised and diversied.
6.3 Results
Table 7 reports the results using the three alternative measures, cluster intensity, special-
isation and diversication.
Table 7 column [1] shows the urban area level analysis for the 2005 cross-section. Our
new measure ClusterIntensity turns out positive and highly signicant. This means
that urban areas with important clusters of concentrated sectors rise higher business
taxes than others. However, the eect is rather small: a one-standard deviation in-
crease in ClusterIntensity leads to a 0:0006  8:9593 = :5% points increase in tax rates.
Specialisation is insignicant while Diversification is also positively related to tax rates.
Column [2] uses the 1985 to 2005 panel and includes urban area xed eects. The eect
of our measure is now negative though not signicantly so.
Table 7 column [3] shows the municipality level analysis for the 2005 cross-section. All
three measures are signicantly and positively related to local tax rates. The eects are
smaller that in the urban area level analysis. Column [4] also uses the 2005 cross-section
but adds urban area xed eects, i.e. only exploits the within urban area variation. The
eect of our new measure ClusterIntensity remains positive and signicant though it is
not substantial any more: a one-standard deviation increase in ClusterIntensity leads to
a 0:00063  0:5916 = :04% points increase in tax rates.
Table 7 column [5] shows the municipality level analysis for the 1985 to 2005 panel.
Column [6] adds urban area-year xed eects. This turns the eect of ClusterIntensity
signicantly negative but it remains economically small. The negative eect likely stems
from inverse causality when tax cuts attract new clusters. Unfortunately, our instruments
used in Section 5 are not credible to instrument our alternative measures. The results in
this section are therefore at best indicative.
207 Conclusion
In this paper we study whether local policy makers eectively tax agglomeration rents, as
predicted by the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature. To test this mechanism we
use data from a panel of Swiss municipalities. We face several challenges bridging the gap
between theoretical model and empirical evaluation. First, the standard tax competition
model with asymmetric jurisdiction size also predicts that small locations (tax havens)
have lower tax rates than large ones, but the economic implications are very dierent. To
separate the two eects we make a clear dierence between the political and economic
size of a location by developing a measure for each denition of size. We nd that large
urban areas exhibit higher tax rates than small ones. This is consistent with the NEG
prediction whereby agglomeration rents are taxed in the competition among urban areas.
Within urban areas, however, the size of the economically relevant area in and around
a municipality is unrelated to its tax level while the size within its political borders is
positively related. We see this result as evidence, that the tax haven mechanism rather
than the NEG mechanism is at work in the competition of municipalities within an urban
area. Second, there could be important unobserved and unobservable local characteristics.
We address this problem by including municipality xed eects to control for omitted
variables. Despite the 20 year lag in the data there is very little time variation we can
exploit, and the large condence intervals neither detect signicant eects nor rule out the
positive eects estimated in the cross-section. Third, the size of local jurisdictions is likely
aected by local tax rates and therefore endogenous. We instrument 2005 employment
with 1850 population gures and 1985 to 2005 employment growth with a set of variables
based on initially available land reserves and initial sector composition. Our instruments
turn out to be very strong for the cross-section analysis but rather weak for the panel
analysis. Our cross-section results are robust to controlling for reverse causality. As a
robustness check we introduce a new measure of cluster intensity which considers the
varying intensities in agglomeration economies across sectors.
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7
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
0
.
1
7
0
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
8
8
0
.
0
5
8
1
‐
0
.
1
8
7
4
*
*
*
‐
0
.
0
7
7
0
.
1
7
4
4
*
*
*
0
.
1
6
2
6
*
*
*
0
.
1
7
4
6
*
*
*
0
.
1
6
1
1
*
*
*
0
.
1
4
5
5
(
0
.
0
0
7
3
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
8
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
1
)
(
0
.
0
4
9
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
4
7
4
)
(
0
.
0
5
7
1
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
8
)
(
0
.
0
9
0
7
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
4
2
2
W
e
a
k
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
T
e
s
t
5
4
9
.
4
2
0
.
7
R
‐
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
1
5
0
.
0
1
5
0
.
2
6
7
0
.
2
1
4
0
.
7
5
5
0
.
7
5
5
0
.
7
5
5
0
.
7
5
7
0
.
7
3
8
N
 
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
8
4
5
N
 
U
r
b
a
n
 
A
r
e
a
s
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
t
a
x
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
n
t
o
n
a
l
 
t
a
x
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
9
%
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
,
 
h
e
t
e
r
o
s
c
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
‐
r
o
b
u
s
t
,
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
b
y
u
r
b
a
n
a
r
e
a
s
f
o
r
L
S
D
V
a
n
d
I
V
D
V
m
o
d
e
l
s
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
a
t
*
p
<
0
1
0
*
*
p
<
0
0
5
*
*
*
p
<
0
0
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
 
 
 
 
 
.
,
 
 
.
,
 
 
.
.
1
 
O
L
S
:
 
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
l
y
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
s
q
u
a
r
e
s
,
 
I
V
:
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
 
L
S
D
V
:
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
s
q
u
a
r
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
 
I
V
D
V
:
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
2
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
.
3
 
S
u
m
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
u
r
i
n
g
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
i
n
v
e
r
s
e
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
.
4
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
e
d
 
a
r
e
 
l
o
g
(
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
)
 
f
o
r
 
b
o
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
u
r
b
a
n
 
a
r
e
a
.
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
l
o
g
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
1
8
5
0
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
g
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
1
8
5
0
 
w
i
t
h
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
u
r
s
.
 
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
A
2
.
5
 
K
l
e
i
b
e
r
g
e
n
‐
P
a
a
p
 
r
a
n
k
 
F
‐
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
.
28t
a
b
l
e
6
.
x
l
s
x
,
 
2
1
.
0
3
.
2
0
1
1
,
 
1
2
:
5
8
t
a
b
l
e
6
.
x
l
s
x
,
 
2
1
.
0
3
.
2
0
1
1
,
 
1
2
:
5
8
e
r
r
o
r
s
p
a
r
e
n
t
a
s
t
t
y
r
o
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
m
u
n
p
a
l
i
e
n
t
s
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
6
:
 
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
L
e
v
e
l
,
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
1
9
8
5
‐
2
0
0
5
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
1
R
E
F
E
/
F
D
F
E
/
F
D
F
D
‐
I
V
[
1
]
[
2
]
[
3
]
[
4
]
l
o
g
(
E
m
p
l
M
u
n
i
)
2
0
.
0
0
1
7
0
.
0
1
4
5
‐
0
.
0
0
3
8
0
.
0
0
2
(
0
.
0
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
1
2
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
6
4
)
(
0
.
0
1
3
5
)
l
o
g
(
E
m
p
l
D
i
s
t
)
3
0
.
0
1
1
4
*
*
0
.
0
2
8
2
‐
0
.
0
2
6
7
‐
0
.
0
3
3
7
(
0
.
0
0
4
8
)
(
0
.
0
8
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
3
8
7
)
(
0
.
0
5
8
0
)
F
r
e
n
c
h
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
0
2
2
6
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
3
7
)
C
e
n
t
r
e
‐
0
.
0
0
6
2
(
0
.
0
0
4
2
)
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
C
i
t
y
‐
0
.
0
0
3
5
(
0
.
0
0
5
5
)
Y
e
a
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
U
r
b
a
n
 
a
r
e
a
 
x
 
y
e
a
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
4
5
W
e
a
k
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
 
T
e
s
t
5
3
.
0
6
N
4
1
4
4
1
4
3
9
2
N
 
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
2
0
7
2
0
7
1
9
6
1
9
6
N
 
U
r
b
a
n
 
A
r
e
a
s
6
5
3
5
3
4
2
4
2
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
t
a
x
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
n
t
o
n
a
l
 
t
a
x
,
 
9
%
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
h
e
t
e
r
o
s
c
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
r
o
b
u
s
t
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
b
y
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
 
i
n
 
h
e
s
e
s
,
 
h
e
t
e
r
o
s
c
e
d
i
c
i
‐
b
u
s
t
,
 
c
l
 
b
y
 
i
c
i
t
y
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
*
 
p
<
0
.
1
0
,
 
*
*
 
p
<
0
.
0
5
,
 
*
*
*
 
p
<
0
.
0
1
.
1
R
E
:
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
,
 
F
E
:
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
,
 
F
D
:
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
,
 
I
V
:
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
 
 
F
E
 
a
n
d
 
F
D
 
y
i
e
l
d
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
c
a
l
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
.
2
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
.
3
 
S
u
m
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
u
r
i
n
g
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
i
n
v
e
r
s
e
 
d
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
.
4
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
1
9
8
5
 
l
a
n
d
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
m
i
x
.
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
A
2
.
5
 
K
l
e
i
b
e
r
g
e
n
‐
P
a
a
p
 
r
a
n
k
 
F
‐
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
.
6
 
D
a
t
a
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
1
 
u
r
b
a
n
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
i
s
 
d
r
o
p
p
e
d
 
i
n
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
u
r
b
a
n
 
a
r
e
a
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
[
3
]
 
a
n
d
 
[
4
]
)
 
a
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
o
n
e
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
i
s
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
.
29t
a
b
l
e
7
.
x
l
s
x
,
 
1
7
.
0
3
.
2
0
1
1
,
 
1
2
:
4
1
t
a
b
l
e
7
.
x
l
s
x
,
 
1
7
.
0
3
.
2
0
1
1
,
 
1
2
:
4
1
T
a
b
l
e
 
7
:
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
U
r
b
a
n
 
A
r
e
a
 
L
e
v
e
l
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
L
e
v
e
l
2
0
0
5
1
9
8
5
‐
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
5
 
C
r
o
s
s
‐
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
1
9
8
5
‐
2
0
0
5
 
P
a
n
e
l
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
1
O
L
S
F
E
O
L
S
L
S
D
V
F
E
F
E
‐
L
S
D
V
[
1
]
[
2
]
[
3
]
[
4
]
[
5
]
[
6
]
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
8
.
9
5
9
3
*
*
*
‐
4
.
9
4
9
9
2
.
4
3
5
7
*
*
*
0
.
5
9
1
6
*
*
*
‐
0
.
8
8
0
5
*
*
*
‐
0
.
2
4
9
4
*
*
(
3
.
0
0
9
8
)
(
3
.
4
6
8
1
)
(
0
.
6
9
7
7
)
(
0
.
1
7
6
4
)
(
0
.
2
7
2
3
)
(
0
.
1
0
9
5
)
S
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
1
2
2
4
‐
0
.
0
8
7
2
0
.
0
3
8
0
*
*
0
.
0
1
2
7
0
.
0
5
6
6
0
.
0
3
2
9
(
0
.
1
0
4
1
)
(
0
.
1
6
6
4
)
(
0
.
0
1
7
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
8
3
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
3
)
(
0
.
0
2
3
2
)
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
0
0
4
7
*
*
‐
0
.
0
0
2
1
0
.
0
0
2
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
0
5
0
.
0
0
0
9
0
.
0
0
1
1
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
4
)
(
0
.
0
0
0
6
)
F
r
e
n
c
h
I
t
a
l
i
a
n
0
.
0
2
4
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
4
3
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
5
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
8
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
5
)
(
0
.
0
1
0
3
)
C
e
n
t
r
e
‐
0
.
0
1
3
2
*
*
*
‐
0
.
0
0
3
2
(
0
.
0
0
4
4
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
4
)
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
C
i
t
y
0
.
0
0
1
1
0
.
0
0
2
(
0
.
0
0
5
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
4
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
0
.
0
7
0
2
0
.
1
4
2
8
*
*
*
0
.
1
6
5
2
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
9
4
)
(
0
.
0
0
5
4
)
U
r
b
a
n
 
a
r
e
a
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
y
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
Y
e
a
r
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
U
r
b
a
n
 
a
r
e
a
 
x
 
y
e
a
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
R
‐
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
2
7
0
.
3
5
0
.
1
5
0
.
7
6
0
.
4
8
0
.
9
2
N
 
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
5
5
3
1
7
9
8
4
5
8
4
5
2
0
7
1
9
6
N
 
U
r
b
a
n
 
A
r
e
a
s
5
5
5
3
5
5
5
5
5
3
4
2
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
t
a
x
 
r
a
t
e
,
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
n
t
o
n
a
l
 
t
a
x
,
 
9
%
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
,
 
h
e
t
e
r
o
s
c
e
d
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
‐
r
o
b
u
s
t
.
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
*
 
p
<
0
.
1
0
,
 
*
*
 
p
<
0
.
0
5
,
 
*
*
*
 
p
<
0
.
0
1
.
1
O
L
S
:
 
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
l
y
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
s
q
u
a
r
e
s
,
 
F
E
:
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
,
 
L
S
D
V
:
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
s
q
u
a
r
e
s
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
30t
a
b
l
e
a
1
.
x
l
s
x
,
 
1
7
.
0
3
.
2
0
1
1
,
 
1
2
:
4
2
t
a
b
l
e
a
1
.
x
l
s
x
,
 
1
7
.
0
3
.
2
0
1
1
,
 
1
2
:
4
2
R
o
b
u
s
t
F
‐
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
o
n
e
x
c
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